While Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton might have opinions on waterboarding, they admitted yesterday in their commentary in the New York Times that the 9/11 Commission was not constituted to investigate post-9/11 intelligence gathering methods when they wrote:
“The commission did not have a mandate to investigate how detainees were treated; our role was to investigate the history and evolution of Al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot.”
They alleged, “Those who knew about those videotapes — and did not tell us about them — obstructed our investigation.” Yet they contradicted themselves just a few paragraphs later:
“As a legal matter, it is not up to us to examine the C.I.A.’s failure to disclose the existence of these tapes. That is for others.”
They were provided no less than ten intelligence reports on what the interrogation of Abu Zubayduh revealed, relevant to the Commission’s charter:
Endnotes for Chapter 2:
Endnotes for Chapter 5
#19. … See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Nov. 7, 2002; … [page 150] #31. … See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 29, 2002. … [page 153] #35 … Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 16, 2003… [page 154]
Endnotes for Chapter 6
#5 … See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002… [page 175] #8 … For more on the origins of the Encyclopedia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 24, 2003 … [also page 175] #125 … see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 13, 2003… [page 191]
Endnotes for Chapter 7
The mere opinions of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton provide no evidence of obstruction.
9/11 was their lane and — at least in regards to whether the CIA did or did not obstruct the Commission’s investigation — Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton ought to have stayed within it.
Update, 12:14 PM: An emailer writes:
“They had no right to those tapes. It blows my mind that they demanded to question KSM.”