interrogation videotapes

Kean and Hamilton out of their 9/11 lane

While Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton might have opinions on waterboarding, they admitted yesterday in their commentary in the New York Times that the 9/11 Commission was not constituted to investigate post-9/11 intelligence gathering methods when they wrote:

“The commission did not have a mandate to investigate how detainees were treated; our role was to investigate the history and evolution of Al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot.”

They alleged, “Those who knew about those videotapes — and did not tell us about them — obstructed our investigation.” Yet they contradicted themselves just a few paragraphs later:

“As a legal matter, it is not up to us to examine the C.I.A.’s failure to disclose the existence of these tapes. That is for others.”

They were provided no less than ten intelligence reports on what the interrogation of Abu Zubayduh revealed, relevant to the Commission’s charter:

Endnotes for Chapter 2:

#18. … See, e.g., Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah, Oct. 29, 2002;… [Page 54] #76. …. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003… [page 66]

Endnotes for Chapter 5

#19. … See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Nov. 7, 2002; … [page 150] #31. … See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Aug. 29, 2002. … [page 153] #35 … Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 16, 2003… [page 154]

Endnotes for Chapter 6

#5 … See Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, July 10, 2002… [page 175] #8 … For more on the origins of the Encyclopedia, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, June 24, 2003 … [also page 175] #125 … see Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Dec. 13, 2003… [page 191]

Endnotes for Chapter 7

#90 … Intelligence report, interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, Feb. 19, 2004;… [page 232] #108 … Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah, Feb. 18, 2004… [page 236]

The mere opinions of Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton provide no evidence of obstruction.

9/11 was their lane and — at least in regards to whether the CIA did or did not obstruct the Commission’s investigation — Mr. Kean and Mr. Hamilton ought to have stayed within it.

Update, 12:14 PM: An emailer writes:

“They had no right to those tapes. It blows my mind that they demanded to question KSM.”

Waterboarding top terrorists works and is not torture

Politicians ranting against waterboarding cite Senator John McCain’s actual torture by the North Vietnamese nearly every time, before or after which they pontificate about redeeming America in the eyes of the world and about how “torture” does not work. Their usual spiel is, “Everyone I talk to says torture does not work.” Yet I agree with Deroy Murdock’s assessment: placing plastic wrap over a terrorist’s face, tilting them back, and pouring water over their face to cause them to panic and start talking, while placing them in no actual danger, is nowhere near torture or what McCain experienced. And by the way, waterboarding works:

With all due respect and appreciation for what McCain endured as a P.O.W., a 35-second interval of discomfort for someone who possesses information on active conspiracies to murder Americans is hugely different from months or years of being hung from a wall for trying to protect South Vietnam from Communism. McCain should understand this, but does not. What the Viet Cong did to him was abominable. What America did to Zubaydah, KSM, and an unidentified third terrorist leader was a necessary, rare, and non-injurious tactic for preserving human freedom and protecting the lives of hundreds, perhaps thousands of innocent American civilians. Unlike McCain, Zubaydah and KSM survived this treatment without scars or damaged joints. Not a bad trade-off.

McCain contends that waterboarding is unreliable, since detainees will say anything to make it stop. Yes, they will say anything. As Zubaydah and KSM prove, they even will tell the truth. The veracity of such statements easily can be verified by following leads that such terrorists offer. If other terrorists pop up in spots where detainees said to look for them, then waterboarding once again will have worked.

McCain also argues that America must reject waterboarding, lest our enemies waterboard U.S. GIs. This notion gets all wet when one realizes how difficult it is to waterboard someone who Islamofascists already have beheaded.

Waterboarding should remain in America’s interrogation toolbox. The alternative is to let these assassins stay tight-lipped while the civilized world sits around and waits for the bombs to rip. This is exactly what happened on December 11. While official Washington again burst into tears over waterboarding and fretted over the CIA’s foolishly erased interrogation tapes, al-Qaeda in Islamic North Africa killed 37 in twin bombings in Algeria. Al-Qaeda murdered 17 at a target it dubbed “the international infidels den” — the Algiers office of a New York-based peace organization called the United Nations.

Read Murdock’s full commentary. Keep in mind that the good many examples he cites of how effective waterboarding was (before we stopped using the technique) are just the ones we know about.