With good reason, the United States government continues to classify Khalid Nijer Naser Al-Mutairi and Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil as unlawful combatants, despite their release to the Kuwaiti government. The public relations campaign waged on their behalf fails to say what their Combatant Status Review Tribunals discovered about them. Let’s take a brief look at these two.

The PR for Khalid Nijer Naser Al-Mutairi:

An excerpt from Khalid Nijer Naser Al-Mutairi’s CSRT:

The Recorder presented Exhibit R-1, the Unclassified Summary of Evidence, during the unclassified portion of the Tribunal. It indicates the detainee admitted to affiliation with the Taliban and admitted to traveling to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. It states he received weapons training in the use of hand grenades and the Kalashanikov rifle on the Karabatt line in Afghanistan. The Unclassified Summary of Evidence also asserts the detainee engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. It states the detainee fought against North Alliance forces on the Karabatt line for six months and on the Kawajaqaar line for four months. The summary adds the detainee carried a Kalashnikov rifle and two grenades while on the front lines, and relinquished his weapon and surrendered to Northern Alliance forces at Mazar e-Sharif. Finally, the summary indicates the detainee was injured in the Qala-I-Jenghi prison uprising and eventually surrendered to Northern Alliance forces.

Learn more about the uprising at Qala-I-Janghi by clicking here.

The PR for Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil:

An excerpt from Adil Zamil Abdull Mohssin Al Zamil’s CSRT:

The unclassified evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Recorder indicated that the detainee admitted establishing the al-Wafa organization in Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar, Afghanistan. The al-Wafa organization is listed on Executive Order 13224 as an entity that commits or poses a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism. The evidence also showed that the detainee was closely associated with Suliman Abu Ghaith, a spokesman for al Qalda and Usama Bin Laden. The detainee chose to participate in the Tribunal process. He called no witnesses and requested no documents be produced, but made an oral, sworn statement. The detainee, in his oral statement, admitted being affiliated with al-Wafa, but claimed he was just an employee. He also denied knowing that al Wafa had any connection with terrorism.

Read more about Sulaiman Abu Ghaith by clicking here.

What the PR campaign does not say about the “Kuwaiti 12,” says a lot about those who were hired to represent them.

Today, in the Wall Street Journal, Rohan S. Weerasinghe, senior partner of Shearman & Sterling LLP, says:

“…we did not hire the public relations firm Ms. Burlingame criticizes…”

While Mr. Weerasinghe does not explain whom he refers to when he says “we,” a public relations firm was hired and advised:

“In 2002, relatives of the Kuwaiti detainees, led by an impressive gentleman named Khalid Al-Odah, whose son remains among the detainees, banded together to form the Kuwaiti Family Committee. The group hired the large New York-based law firm Shearman & Sterling to spearhead the battle to grant these prisoners the legal protections provided to U.S. citizens, such as the right to have charges brought against them and the right to a trial.

“To create an environment where reporters knew that this issue deserved open-minded coverage, we devised a two-tiered PR strategy. One tack was to put a human face on the then “invisible” detainees in Guantánamo…”

Apparently, another tack used was to make invisible to the public the facts about the unlawful combatants they presented. That is what is known as spin.

It should also be noted that the Kuwaiti government has acknowledged it is the one paying the lawyers representing the “Kuwaiti 12.”

Michael Reagan, on his radio show Friday, interviewed Debra Burlingame, the author of Gitmo’s Guerrilla Lawyers, who described how the lawyers for the “Kuwaiti 12” created new profiles for their clients. In addition, she spoke of the media’s laziness in investigating the PR claims and how they often collaborated in the effort:

“They made millions of dollars, Sherman and Sterling, and tried to hide it by saying the families of these detainees hired them. In truth, the Kuwaiti government hired them. Another thing they said they were going to give all their fees to a 9/11 charity… the worst thing is they knew they could not sell letting these people go and sending them home if the American people knew these were the hardcore bomb builders, weapons trainers, financiers for al Qaeda, recruiters for al Qaeda. They knew that the American people wouldn’t go for that so they hired a PR firm to reinvent and create new profiles for them…
…
“Color the facts? Its lying and here is why it is lying…” Click here and listen to the entire interview.

While eight of the new and improved “Kuwaiti 12” have been released, four are still detained at Guantanamo. Let’s look at their reinventions and compare them to what their Combatant Status Review Tribunals discovered about them:

Excerpt from al Odah’s CSRT:

The Tribunal initially commensed on 28 August 2004. The unclassified evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Recorder in the form of the Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal (Exhibit R-1) indicated: The detainee is associated with Al Qaida and Taliban; in August or early September 2001, the detainee admitted to traveling through Afghanistan with Taliban members; the detainee admitted to firing an AK-47 at a training camp near Kandahar [Afghanistan]; the detainee admitted to staying at a guesthouse with fighters armed with AK-47 rifles; the detainee engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners; the detainee admitted to carrying an AK-47 through the Tora Bora mountains for ten (10) to eleven (11) days during the U.S. air campaign in that region; and the detainee was captured with five (5) other men by Pakistani border guards.

Excerpt from Rabiah’s CSRT:

You may be concerned because I did happen to see Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) when I traveled to Kandhar in June 2001 to investigate the refugee problems in Afghanistan. I never saw UBL before or after that, I did not travel to see him, I did not expect to see him, and I never spoke with him. After I finished my meetings on the refugee problems, I accompanied the young scholar with whom I was traveling “Abu Almonther” who wanted to talk with Bin Ladin. You must remember that at the time UBL was not the famous terrorist that he is now. I had heard of him basically as a Saudi billionaire who lived as a monk. While there had been some rumors that he had been involved with bad actions, my understanding was that he had denied them. And that he was most famous for fighting the Russians. I accompanied Abu Almonther who went to dinner and to speak with Bin Ladin. The dinner invitation was in his house in the town Kandhar there were no guards or guns anywhere. The invitation lasted two hours. For the next 2 days we were also invited to lunches and dinners by many other people in town also invited many other people including UBL.

Excerpts from Khalid Abudullah Mishaal Al Mutairi’s CSRT:

Two excerpts from Al Kandari’s CSRT: